

February 25, 2026

TOBU TOWER SKYTREE Co., Ltd.

Investigation Results and Recurrence Prevention Measures Regarding the Entrapment  
Incident (Occurred on February 22) Caused by the Stoppage of Tokyo Skytree®  
Observation Deck Elevator.

Tobu Tower Skytree Co., Ltd. (Head Office: Sumida-ku, Tokyo) reports that at Tokyo Skytree, which the company operates, two elevators connecting the 4th-floor entrance area to Floor 350 of the Tembo Deck stopped during operation at around 8:15 pm on Sunday, February 22, 2026. As a result, in one of the elevators, 20 passengers were trapped inside until approximately 2:02 a.m. the following day.

Although none of the guests on board experienced any illness or injuries, we sincerely apologize for the distress caused by the prolonged entrapment.

We also apologize to the guests inside the observation deck, as the incident resulted in significant delays in descending from the deck, causing considerable inconvenience.

We have been investigating the cause of the stoppage of the two elevators, and the cause has now been identified. We have also finalized measures to prevent recurrence, which we hereby report.

Tokyo Skytree will continue to place the highest priority on the safety and security of our guests, and we remain committed to ensuring that all visitors from Japan and abroad can enjoy their visit with complete peace of mind at all times.

Details are provided below.

#### Details

##### 1. Date and Time of Incident

Around 8:15 p.m. on Sunday, February 22, 2026

##### 2. Location of Incident

Approximately 30 meters above ground at Tokyo Skytree (Winter Elevator)

##### 3. Details of the Incident

At around 8:15 pm on Sunday, February 22, the Winter Elevator, after departing Floor 340 of the Tembo Deck and descending toward the 5th-floor exit area, came to a stop at approximately 30 meters above ground. Shortly thereafter, a “fault alarm” was also triggered on the adjacent Autumn Elevator, which was detected by the Disaster Control Center. The Center immediately checked the elevator security cameras and

confirmed that 20 guests were trapped inside the Winter Elevator. Although lighting and air-conditioning inside the Winter Elevator were functioning, the guests were unable to respond to calls made through the intercom from the Disaster Control Center.

Meanwhile, the Autumn Elevator was ascending from the 4th floor toward Floor 350 (350 meters above ground) of the Tembo Deck when its “fault alarm” activated. After arriving on Floor 350 of the Tembo Deck and allowing the guests to disembark, the elevator came to a stop.

We then attempted to rescue the 20 guests trapped in the Winter Elevator in accordance with the prescribed rescue procedures. However, we were unable to move the Winter Elevator to carry out the rescue.

We continued to examine various possible methods, and it was determined that the Autumn Elevator could be safely operated. The Autumn Elevator was then positioned alongside the Winter Elevator, and the emergency side door between the two cars was opened. A metal rescue bridge plate was placed across the gap, allowing the 20 guests to transfer into the Autumn Elevator. At approximately 2:02 a.m. the following day, the Autumn Elevator descended to the 5th-floor exit area, and all 20 guests were safely evacuated.

The 20 guests were given medical checks by paramedics and the emergency medical technicians stationed at our facility. No guests reported any health issues or injuries.

Following this, Tokyo Skytree® temporarily suspended operations from Monday, February 23, to conduct a full inspection of all elevators.

#### 4. Cause

The reason both the Autumn and Winter elevators stopped was that a fuse inside the control panel located in each elevator’s machine room had blown.

The reason the fuse inside the control panel blew was that the traveling cable \*1 of the Winter Elevator became caught in the roller guide of the “rope vibration isolation device” \*2 installed beneath the elevator. This caused the cable’s outer insulation to be stripped, damaging the internal wiring and resulting in a ground fault.

Although the Autumn and Winter elevators each have their own independent control panels, the wiring for the “emergency door-switch signal” used when positioning the elevators side-by-side for emergency rescue was shared between the two control panels.

When the traveling cable of the Winter Elevator became caught and damaged, this shared wiring was also affected. As a result, the fuse inside the Autumn Elevator’s control panel likewise blew, causing it to stop.

\*1: Traveling cable

Cable that connects the elevator’s control panel to the elevator car, containing various circuits (power supply, control signals, communication, etc.) and covered with hard rubber. (Dimensions: approximately 13 cm wide, 2 cm thick, 200 m long; Total weight: approximately 1 ton.)

\*2: Rope vibration isolation device

A device designed to reduce elevator sway and improve ride comfort. This device was installed on three elevators—Spring, Autumn, and Winter—between March 2015 and October 2016 as a measure to reduce elevator sway

caused by strong winds (installation periods are listed below).

March 2015 - Installed on the Winter Elevator  
March 2016 - Installed on the Spring Elevator  
October 2015 - Installed on the Autumn Elevator

## 5. Investigation of the Cause

The entrapment incident in the Winter Elevator occurred because the traveling cable connecting the elevator's control panel to the elevator car became caught in the rotating section of the guide device (roller guide) that enables the elevator to move along its rails.

As a result, the cable's outer insulation was stripped, the internal wiring was damaged, and a ground fault occurred, triggering an emergency stop. This subsequently hindered the rescue operation.

Based on our examination of the factors that caused the traveling cable to become caught in the roller guide, we concluded that the incident was the result of the combination of the following three factors:

<Factors that caused the traveling cable to become caught in the roller guide located beneath the elevator car>

Factor 1: Twisting of the traveling cable itself.

Factor 2: Sway of the elevator's traveling cable caused by sway of the Tokyo Skytree®'s tower structure due to wind.

Factor 3: Absence of a protective cover on the roller guide section of the rope vibration isolation device located beneath the elevator car.

### ■Factor 1

The traveling cable of the elevator had been replaced in December 2025. It is believed that the "twisting" of the traveling cable changed from its initial condition following the replacement.

### ■Factor 2

Since the traveling cable is connected to the tower structure, it is presumed that the tower's sway caused by wind resulted in the cable moving in a direction that brought it closer to the elevator's roller guide. However, that level of movement would not normally interfere with elevator operation.

### ■Factor 3

Normally, the traveling cable does not come into contact with the roller guide beneath the elevator car. However, as a precaution, a protective cover is installed over the roller guide to prevent the traveling cable from making contact with it during significant sway, such as in strong winds.

The Winter Elevator, however, has a customized specification that includes a "rope

vibration isolation device” \*2 mounted beneath the car. This device also features a roller guide that runs along the rail, but no protective cover had been installed on it. As a result, if the traveling cable were to sway significantly due to strong winds or other factors, it is possible that the travel cable could come into contact with the roller guide of the rope vibration isolation device.

### ■ Estimated Mechanism Leading to the Traveling Cable Becoming Caught in the Roller Guide

#### Estimation 1:

Due to *Factor 1*, the traveling cable developed a twist that placed it at an angle more susceptible to being drawn into the roller guide.

#### Estimation 2:

Due to *Factor 2*, sway occurred in the traveling cable, causing the cable and the elevator car to move closer to each other.

#### Estimation 3:

Due to *Factor 3*, the already twisted traveling cable came into contact with the roller guide of the rope vibration isolation device beneath the elevator car and was drawn into it. Therefore, the movement of the traveling cable became restricted and it came into contact with the elevator car. As a result, the outer insulation was stripped, the internal wiring was damaged, and a ground fault occurred, causing the malfunction.

Based on Estimations 1 to 3, we concluded that the insulation of the Winter Elevator’s traveling cable was stripped, the internal wiring was damaged, and a ground fault occurred, resulting in both elevators coming to a stop.

Since Tokyo Skytree® opened in May 2012, no similar situation has occurred, even under wind conditions stronger than those on the day of the incident. We therefore believe that this accident resulted from an extremely rare combination of factors, including the angle of twisting in the traveling cable that was replaced in December 2025, the wind direction, and the elevator’s position at the time of travel, which together caused the traveling cable to become caught in the roller guide.

It was also confirmed that the damage to the internal wiring included damage to the intercom line, which prevented the Disaster Control Center from communicating with the guests inside the elevator.

## 6. Measures to Prevent Recurrence

We reviewed preventive measures addressing Factors 1 through 3 and decided to implement the following actions.

### ■ Countermeasure for Factor 1

For the traveling cables of the Spring, Summer, and Autumn elevators (excluding the Winter Elevator), we inspected their condition to confirm that no twisting had occurred.

In addition, based on the estimated mechanism of the incident, we have examined the behavior of the traveling cables during elevator operation. No abnormalities were found as a result of these inspections.

■ Countermeasure for Factor 2

Based on past operational data, we determined that no additional measures are required with respect to the tower's sway.

■ Countermeasure for Factor 3

We decided to implement a measure to add protective covers to the roller-guide sections of the "rope vibration isolation devices" installed on the Spring, Autumn, and Winter elevators, in order to prevent the traveling cable from coming into contact with them. With this measure, even if the traveling cable were to twist and sway in the same manner as in this incident, due to cable twisting or tower sway, it would be prevented from becoming entangled in the roller guide of the rope vibration isolation device.

(Note: The Summer Elevator is not equipped with a rope vibration isolation device.)

## 7. Results of the Comprehensive Inspection of the Tokyo Skytree® Observation Deck Elevators

Following the entrapment incident, we conducted a full inspection of all elevators used by guests. The three elevators connecting the 4th floor to the Tembo Deck (Spring, Summer, and Autumn elevators), the two elevators connecting the Tembo Deck to the Tembo Galleria, and the elevator connecting the various floors within the Tembo Deck.

We confirmed that no abnormalities were found in any of these elevators.

Regarding the Winter Elevator, we will continue inspections, including replacement of the traveling cable and related components.

## 8. Reopening of Tokyo Skytree Operations

Based on the implementation of countermeasures for the Spring, Summer, and Autumn elevators, as well as the results of the full inspection of all Tokyo Skytree observation deck elevators, we have confirmed the safety of all elevators used by guests.

Accordingly, Tokyo Skytree will resume observation deck operations from 10:00 am on Thursday, February 26.

## <Reference 1>

Timeline of the Elevator Stoppage Incident at the Tokyo Skytree® Observation Deck on Sunday, February 22

February 22, 2026 (Sunday)

Around 20:15

Of the four elevators traveling from ground level to the Tembo Deck (350 m above ground), the Winter Elevator switched into “inspection mode” while descending from Tembo Deck Floor 340 (340 m above ground) to the 5th-floor exit area and came to a stop at approximately 30 m above ground.

\*20 guests were on board (7 men, 13 women, including 2 children)

Afterward, the Autumn Elevator, which had been ascending from the 4th-floor entrance area to Tembo Deck Floor 350 (350 m above ground), triggered a “malfunction alarm.”

The passengers disembarked at Floor 350, after which the elevator stopped.

A passenger in the Winter Elevator called the police (dialed 110).

The Spring and Summer elevators were also stopped as a safety precaution.

\*At this point, approximately 1,200 guests were waiting in the Tembo Deck and Tembo Galleria.

Around 21:30

The Spring and Summer elevators were restarted, and guests in the observation areas were escorted to ground level.

Around 22:45

All guests who had been waiting in the observation areas were safely escorted to ground level.

February 23, 2026 (Mon / National Holiday)

01:16

The Autumn Elevator began descending from 350 m to approximately 30 m above ground.

01:38

The Autumn Elevator arrived near the 30 m position.

01:46

Transfer of guests from the Winter Elevator to the Autumn Elevator began.

01:55

All guests completed the transfer to the Autumn Elevator.

02:02

The Autumn Elevator descended to the 5th floor, rescuing all guests. Medical checks were conducted.

02:18

Confirmed that none of the guests had health issues.

02:35

All guests exited the building.

\*4 guests traveled to a hotel by taxi, 16 guests returned home by taxi.

07:00

Announcement of temporary closure of Tokyo Skytree<sup>®</sup> on February 23.

17:00

Announcement of temporary closure of Tokyo Skytree on February 24.

February 24, 2026 (Tuesday)

15:00

A full inspection was conducted on the three elevators connecting the 4th floor and the Tembo Deck (Spring, Summer, Autumn), the two elevators connecting the Tembo Deck and the Tembo Galleria, and the elevator connecting floors within the Tembo Deck.

→ No abnormalities were found.

Around 17:30

Announcement of temporary closure of Tokyo Skytree on February 25.


February 25, 2026 (Wednesday)

17:00

Announcement of the cause of the incident, the implemented countermeasures, and the reopening of observation deck operations from 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, February 26.

<Reference 2>


Overall Elevator Drawing




<Reference 3 >

Addition of Protective Covers to the Rope Vibration Isolation Devices Installed Beneath the Elevator Car

■ Before measures




■ After measures




<Reference 4 >

【Structure of the Traveling Cable (Cross-Section)】



Damaged Lines:  
 Safety circuit line  
 Control signal line  
 Intercom line

【Damage Status of the Traveling Cable in the Winter Elevator】



Normal Travel Cable



Damaged Travel Cable

<Reference 5 >

TOKYO SKYTREE® Overview of elevators connecting ground floor to Tembo Deck

- Number of Elevators Installed: 4 units (Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter)
- Speed / Travel Time: 600 meters per minute; approx. 50 seconds to reach the destination
- Elevator Car Dimensions: Approx. 2,250 mm (depth) × 2,250 mm (width) × 3,000 mm (height)
- Specifications of the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter Elevators:

Rope-type, wheelchair accessible

Capacity: 40 passengers

Rated load: 2,600 kg

Manufacturer: Toshiba Elevator and Building Systems Corporation

